China's Military Reach Ends New Zealand's Geographic Immunity
Distance can no longer serve as New Zealand's primary defence strategy, as China's military expansion reshapes the Indo-Pacific security order. The Chinese DF-27 ballistic missile, now operational with a range of 5,000 to 8,000 kilometres, could eventually reach the New Zealand mainland, according to a recent Lowy Institute analysis.
This development follows a Chinese naval task group conducting live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea last year, below a vital air route linking Australia and New Zealand. The exercises, held without warning, breached regional norms requiring advance notification and demonstrated Beijing's ability to project force into waters long considered remote by New Zealand.
Rising Tensions and Incidents
In April, a New Zealand surveillance aircraft monitoring North Korean sanctions evasion was accused by China of close-in reconnaissance and harassment. This incident followed others: in December, Chinese fighter jets directed fire-control radar at Japanese F-15 jets near Okinawa, and in March, Australia protested after a Chinese naval helicopter conducted what Canberra described as an unsafe intercept of an Australian military helicopter over the Yellow Sea.
For New Zealand, a trading nation with a vast marine estate and an economy reliant on secure shipping and undersea telecommunication links, these developments pose difficult questions about whether the nation's defence posture is keeping pace with a fast-changing region.
New Zealand's Defence Spending: Slow and Criticised
New Zealand's government is slowly adapting. Its 2025 Defence Capability Plan commits NZ$12 billion over four years, including NZ$9 billion of new spending, aiming to lift defence spending from just over 1% of GDP to above 2% over eight years. The plan funds enhanced strike capabilities, new frigates, maritime drones and upgraded surveillance. However, the eight-year timetable has drawn criticism.
At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue security conference, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth criticised New Zealand's plan, calling it freeloading and urging allies to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence. Defence Minister Chris Penk rejected the criticism, while Finance Minister Nicola Willis argued New Zealand does not have billions of dollars sitting under the couch. The US alliance is not a substitute for domestic investment as the regional balance shifts.
Japan: A New Strategic Partner
If New Zealand is serious about rejuvenating its defence force, Japan emerges as a key partner. On the sidelines of Shangri-La, New Zealand, Australia and Japan held their first trilateral defence ministers' meeting. Japan's defence minister Shinjiro Koizumi urged like-minded states to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Japan has decades of experience confronting security challenges now becoming more familiar across the Indo-Pacific, from North Korean missile threats to sustained Chinese military activity around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan. Following law changes allowing defence exports, Japan can now supply advanced military equipment to partners.
This is directly relevant to New Zealand's largest looming defence decision: replacing its Anzac-class frigates. The Japanese Mogami-class frigate, already selected by Australia, is among the options alongside the UK's Type 31 frigates. The choice is about more than the ships themselves; it is about who New Zealand will rely on for training, spare parts, software upgrades and repairs over coming decades.
Strategic Implications of Frigate Selection
The Mogami's heavy automation suits a country with vast maritime responsibilities and limited crew. Purchasing the platform would embed New Zealand in an emerging Australia-Japan network, as Canberra is acquiring 11 of the vessels. Japan is geographically far closer than the United Kingdom, which could be critical during a future regional crisis or conflict where interoperability with regional partners becomes essential.
Defence choices can no longer wait. The period in which New Zealand could treat distance as a substitute for strategy is over. The geopolitical challenge is growing, the pace of spending response is arguably lacking, and among partners able to help close the gap, Japan is the partner Wellington is most likely to prioritise. Allies are already signalling they expect more from New Zealand, and the cost of moving too slowly will be measured not only in capability but in credibility.
